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CARROLL, NOËL and GIBSON, JOHN, eds.  Narrative, Emotion, and Insight.  
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011, 198pp., $64.95. 
 
This book is a collection of nine essays inspired by a conference of the same name, held at 
the Free Library of Philadelphia in 2006.  The focus is on narrative and how the answers to 
questions about fiction, particularly those related to insight and emotion, change when asked 
of narrative instead.  The differences are most obvious and gratifying in John Gibson and 
Derek Matravers’ respective papers, though the conclusions reached may be the result of the 
authors’ perspicacity rather than the switch in focus.  All the essays are nonetheless original 
and thought-provoking contributions to the philosophical literature on narrative.             
 
Gibson’s introduction defines the subject of the collection, the everyday understanding of 
narrative as the representation or presentation of stories, and provides a convenient summary 
of each paper.  This is followed by the late Peter Goldie’s essay, “Life, Fiction, and 
Narrative”, which identifies narratives as stories that are coherent, meaningful, and 
emotionally important.  His aim is to assess the value of thinking about our lives through 
narrative by comparing the dangers with the benefits.  The former are the “fictionalizing 
tendencies” (p.8) of narrative: plotting our lives, finding agency where there is none, the 
desire for closure, and regarding our own character in terms of genre.  Goldie’s presentation 
of the psychological benefits is regrettably restricted to a single paragraph, where he notes 
that narratives help us deal with contingency and the bleakness of a scientific world without 
meaning.  There is no explicit conclusion, but the implication is that as long as we are aware 
of the fictionalizing tendencies, narrative thinking serves a useful function. 
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The next two essays both address an issue in philosophy of film, the question of whether a 
work of film can be a work of philosophy.  Berys Gaut’s “Telling Stories” examines the 
complexity of the narrative structure of Memento (Christopher Nolan, 2000), and 
discriminates between narrative (what is presented) and narration (how it is presented) 
reminiscent of the content-form dichotomy.  He highlights the significance of the Easter Egg 
on the DVD, a special feature which allows viewers to watch the film scenes in chronological 
order.  While complex narrative structures are common to the art form, the Easter Egg is 
unique to Memento.  Gaut claims that the narrative in both versions is the same (it is the same 
story), and that the differences in the artistic properties are thus differences in the narration.  
By drawing attention to this distinction, he shows how the film forces us into the situation of 
the protagonist, who has anterograde amnesia, and augments the viewer’s imaginative 
identification.  Gaut’s main point is that the film not only asserts three claims about the 
world, but provides experiential or narrative confirmation of: the unreliability of memory, the 
tendency to fictionalize (to use Goldie’s term), and the necessity of memory for 
understanding.  This evidence demonstrates how “narration can position viewers both 
cognitively and emotionally, and how doing so can teach them things of some importance 
about the actual world” (p.42).  Noël Carroll’s essay, “Philosophical Insight, Emotion, and 
Popular Fiction” advances the case for Sunset Boulevard (Billy Wilder, 1950) doing 
philosophy.  He provides a compelling critique of the film and then examines three general 
objections to it doing philosophy: the no-argument argument, the banality argument, and the 
excessive elaboration argument.  While Carroll sees off each in turn, his conclusion, that 
Sunset Boulevard can do popular philosophy, is disappointing.  There seems little doubt that 
film can do popular philosophy and even continental philosophy, as Stephen Mulhall has 
noted of Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982) with reference to Nietzsche and Heidegger (On 
Film [Routledge 2002], pp.41-49).  The more interesting question is whether film can do 
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analytic philosophy, and Gaut seems to have indicated the direction future inquiry might 
take. 
 
Gibson begins “Thick Narratives” by identifying literary content with ethical significance, 
and then re-frames the familiar moralist-automomist question of whether a moral defect can 
be an aesthetic defect as the puzzle of why we value morally vicious works of literature (for 
example, T.S. Eliot’s anti-Semitic poetry).  He distinguishes between a story and a narrative, 
associating the former with content and the latter with form, the significance being that the 
story can be transformed by the way it is narrated.  The term ‘thick narrative’ draws on 
Ryle’s conception of thick and thin descriptions, and thick narratives “have as their goal the 
articulation of a kind of content that is clearly ethical but that has very little to do with the 
specification of duties, obligations, or methods for determining the moral worth of possible 
courses of action” (p.76).  A further distinction is made between ethical life and moral 
philosophy, where the latter prescribes courses of action and the former describes human 
cultural practices.  By being ethical rather than moral, thick narratives can provide an insight 
into ethical values without promoting a particular morality.  Gibson thus not only answers the 
initial question in his paper, but also shows that the question of the value of literature is more 
profound than the current debate suggests.                 
 
The next four essays are all concerned with meaning in human life, and the first two deal with 
self-narratives.  In “Narrative, Emotions, and Autonomy”, Amy Mullin defines meta-
affective skills as those which enable us to recognize our own emotional responses and reflect 
upon the guidance they provide.  The paper complements Gibson’s by developing his 
conception of thick narratives (though Mullin does not employ the term).  She   argues that 
narratives increase our personal autonomy by refining our meta-affective skills and that the 
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features of narratives most likely to do this are: thick, focused on purposiveness and emotion 
in characters, and involving imaginings which have the potential to influence action in 
readers.  The rest of the essay demonstrates the operation of this theory by reference to three 
novels.  In “Narrative Rehearsal, Expression, and Goethe’s ‘Wandrers Nachtlied II’”, Richard 
Eldridge examines six options for achieving “continuing, self-determining orientation for 
human subjects in post-Kantian modernity” (p.116 ).  He favours Hölderlin’s lyrical 
embodiment of modulation and explores the similarities with Goethe’s poetology before 
examining three theories of artistic expression in order to determine how literature can probe 
and resolve problematic emotions.  Eldridge maintains that Wordsworth integrates all three of 
these and offers his own definition of art as a focus for thought, emotion, and the 
imagination.  He then presents a detailed literary analysis of the poem in the title, which 
draws on Adorno’s interpretation and demonstrates how it provides a continuing, self-
determining orientation by facilitating the full exercise of human attention and expression.                                  
 
Aaron Smuts turns to the art form of song in “Rubber Ring”, asking why we listen to sad 
songs when they appear to make us feel worse.  He begins by establishing a paradigm for 
song, describes a sad song as one intended to arouse sadness in listeners, and identifies a 
feature of sad songs as typically possessing thin narratives (in Gibson’s terminology).  This 
characteristic accounts for the popularity of the genre as it facilitates the personalization of 
content by a very wide audience.  Smuts argues convincingly that the experience of listening 
to these songs has constitutive value, and that we do not seek catharsis but an intensification 
of the painful emotion in order to better understand what is significant to us.  Susan Feagin 
examines “Discovery Plots in Tragedy”, classifying the sub-category in terms of its two 
crucial features: plots with unusual circumstances, and the protagonist as the key to unlocking 
the mystery.  These two elements allow tragedies with discovery plots to be relevant not just 
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to their unique time and place, but to a general audience.  Feagin provides an in-depth 
analysis of: discovery (“enlightenment” in Arthur Miller’s terms [p.170]) in tragedy, the 
varieties of unusual circumstances in discovery plots, and the essential role of the protagonist.  
This is followed by a detailed critique of Scorched by Wajdi Mouawad.  Feagin maintains 
that the play serves as confirmation of “the meaningfulness of tragic discovery” (p.171) as 
opposed to the absurd freedom and radical contingency proposed by Sartre and other 
existentialist philosophers.  Unfortunately, this contrast is not developed further.   
 
Derek Matravers offers a fresh look at an old problem in “Imagination, Fiction, and 
Documentary”.  He begins with the familiar distinction between imagination (or imaginary 
belief) and belief, the sense in which I am not motivated to assist the protagonist in a fictional 
film or call for an ambulance when he is wounded.  This is not, Matravers maintains, because 
I am watching fiction, but because the film is a representation.  The imagination is employed 
in both types of representations, fictional and documentary, and I am no more motivated to 
assist a fictional protagonist than I am to assist a real person in distress on a televised news 
broadcast.  This is because there is no confrontation-relation: I am neither in the presence of 
the protagonist nor of the people in the news.  Matravers notes that representation-relations 
may motivate in a different way.  Reading Orwell’s 1984 causes me to oppose totalitarianism 
rather than assist Winston Smith, and this is the result of the novel being a representation 
rather than a fiction.  The choice is not therefore between imagination or belief because there 
are actually two questions at stake.  The first is whether I have an imaginative engagement 
with a narrative, be it 1984 or Prescott’s History of the Conquest of Peru; the second is 
whether that narrative is fictional or not.  This dual distinction is highly significant and casts 
doubt on some of the previous work of Radford, Walton, Meskin, Weinberg, and Currie.  
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Like Gibson, Matravers provides a penetrating perspective on a contemporary debate in 
philosophy.          
 
As a final observation, it is interesting to note the extent to which so many essays in this 
collection rely upon a critical analysis of a specific narrative in support of either inductive or 
deductive argument.  The feature may, however, be a result of similarity in styles rather than 
the shared subject-matter.  In conclusion, the book is a rewarding read which will be useful to 
those working in philosophy of the self, personality psychology, and ethics in addition to 
aesthetics and philosophy of art.   
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